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Abstract
In this work, we seek to investigate the existence of nonlinearities in the reaction function of the Central Bank of Brazil arising
from this policymaker’s uncertainties about the effects of the output gap on inflation. Theoretically, we follow Tillmann (2011) to
obtain a nonlinear optimal monetary policy rule that is robust to uncertainty about the output-inflation trade-off of the Phillips Curve.
In addition, we perform structural break tests to assess possible changes in the conduct of the Brazilian monetary policy during the
inflation-targeting regime. The results indicate that: (i) the uncertainties about the slope in the Phillips curve implied nonlinearities
in the Central Bank of Brazil’s reaction function; (ii) we cannot reject the hypothesis of a structural break in the monetary rule
parameters occurring in the third quarter of 2003; (iii) there was an increase in the response of the Selic rate to output gap and a
weaker response to the current inflation gap in Meirelles–Tombini’s administration; and (iv) the Central Bank of Brazil has also
reacted to the exchange rate in Meirelles–Tombini’s administration.
© 2016 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52; C22; E58
Keywords: Robust monetary policy; Nonlinear interest rate rules; Structural breaks; Endogeneity; Brazil
Resumo
Neste trabalho, nós procuramos investigar a existência de não linearidades na func¸ão de reac¸ão do Banco Central do Brasil
decorrentes de incertezas desse policymaker  acerca dos efeitos do hiato do produto sobre a inflac¸ão. Teoricamente, nós seguimos
Tillmann (2011) para obter uma regra de política monetária ótima não linear que é robusta às incertezas acerca do trade-off  produto-
inflac¸ão na curva de Phillips. Além disso, nós realizamos testes de quebra estrutural para avaliar possíveis mudanc¸as na conduc¸ão da
política monetária brasileira durante o regime de metas de inflac¸ão. Os resultados indicaram que: i) as incertezas acerca da inclinac¸ão
na curva Phillips implicaram em não linearidades na func¸ão de reac¸ão do Banco Central do Brasil; ii) não se pode rejeitar a hipótese
de uma quebra estrutural nos parâmetros da regra monetária ocorrendo no terceiro trimestre de 2003; iii) houve um aumento na∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +55 08332167482.
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esposta da taxa Selic ao hiato do produto e uma reduc¸ão da reac¸ão ao hiato da inflac¸ão corrente no regime Meirelles-Tombini; e
v) o Banco Central do Brasil também tem reagido à taxa de câmbio durante o regime Meirelles-Tombini.
 2016 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
alavras-chave: Política monetária robusta; Regra de taxa de juros não linear; Quebras estruturais; Endogeneidade; Brasil
.  Introduction
In the 1990s, the inflation-targeting regime was adopted by several countries as an alternative for the conduct of
onetary policy and for the maintenance of price stability. In Brazil, this regime was implemented by the Central Bank
f Brazil (CBB) in July 1999. This happened six months after the exchange rate band system was replaced with a
oating system. Given exchange rate overshooting and the rise in inflation and in inflation expectations, the Brazilian
overnment intended to implement a policy regime that could maintain price stability and establish a new nominal
nchor for inflation.
Numerous papers, seeking to assess the CBB’s monetary policy decisions during the inflation-targeting regime,
ave estimated the Taylor (1993) rule or the forward-looking reaction function introduced by Clarida et al.  (2000). In
ine with Taylor’s (1993) monetary rule, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate to the deviations of current
nflation from the inflation target and to the current output gap. On the other hand, Clarida et al.’s (2000) policy rule
ssumes the monetary authority adjusts the interest rate according to the inflation and output gap expectations for the
uture. Some authors like Minella et al.  (2003) and Minella and Souza-Sobrinho (2013) estimated a forward-looking
eaction function and concluded that the CBB had a strong reaction to inflation expectations. Sanches-Fung (2011)
stimated reaction functions for the CBB in a data-rich environment. His evidence demonstrates that the CBB adjusted
he Selic interest rate by following the Taylor principle, but that it did not respond systematically to exchange rate
ovements.
The papers referenced above take for granted that interest rate rules are linear functions of variables that indicate
conomic status. However, empirical evidence has pointed out important nonlinearities in the monetary policy rule.
obay and Peel (2000), Schaling (2004) and Dolado et al. (2005) argue that a nonlinear optimal monetary rule takes
hape whenever the central bank has a quadratic loss function and the Phillips curve is nonlinear. Bec et al. (2002),
obay and Peel (2003), Dolado et al. (2004), Surico (2007), and Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) mention that
onlinearities in the optimal monetary rule may be present should the monetary authority have asymmetric preferences
or inflation and/or for the output gap. Kato and Nishiyama (2005) and Adam and Billi (2006) show that if the nominal
nterest rate has a lower bound equal to zero, the central bank may have a stronger reaction to a decrease in inflation
o as to reduce the probability of deflation.
Brazilian studies on monetary policy rule nonlinearities look into specific characteristics of the CBB’s asymmetric
eaction. For instance, Aragon and Portugal (2010), Sá and Portugal (2011), and Aragon and Medeiros (2013) describe
n asymmetric preference of the Brazilian monetary authority for an above-target inflation during the inflation-targeting
egime. Moura and Carvalho (2010) gather empirical evidence in favor of nonlinearities in the reaction function that is
onsistent with the CBB’s asymmetric preference for inflation. Lopes and Aragon (2014) evince that the nonlinearity
n the interest rate rule results from time-varying asymmetric preferences, and not from possible nonlinearities in
he Phillips curve. Schifino et al. (2013) reveal the nonnegativity constraint on the Selic interest rate may hinder the
alibration of the CBB’s preferences, being conducive to nonlinearities in the optimal monetary rule. Aragon and
edeiros (2015) estimate a reaction function whose parameters vary over time and conclude that the reaction of the
elic rate to inflation varies remarkably throughout the period, showing a downtrend during the inflation-targeting
egime.
In contrast to the studies referenced above, this paper’s prime goal is to investigate nonlinearities in the CBB’s
eaction function as a result of this policymaker’s concern about specification errors in the macroeconomic model. In
articular, we follow Tillmann (2011) to obtain a nonlinear optimal monetary policy rule that is robust to uncertainties
ver the effects of output gap on inflation. The estimation of this monetary rule allows checking for the presence of
onlinearities in the CBB’s monetary policy conduct produced by specification errors in the model. In addition, we
eek to run structural break tests to assess possible changes in the CBB’s reaction function coefficients during the
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inflation-targeting regime. With regard to this latter goal, it should be borne in mind that, from 1999 to 2013, the
Brazilian economy was assailed by several shocks (energy crisis in 2001, exchange rate crisis in 2002, recession in
2003, world economic crisis in 2008, etc.), and that the CBB was run by three different presidents (Armínio Fraga
(1999–2002), Henrique Meirelles (2003–2010), and Alexandre Tombini (2011–). These facts may have altered the
way the CBB reacts to macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and output.1
Because of the presence of endogenous regressors, the method used to test structural breaks in the CBB’s reaction
function parameters will be the one developed by Perron and Yamamoto (2015). The procedures proposed by those
authors are based on the estimation by ordinary least squares (OLS) and by instrumental variables (IV), which allows
estimating structural break dates and running tests for checking whether these breaks are statistically significant.
This paper’s results can be summarized as follows. First, empirical evidence indicates the uncertainties about the
slope in the Phillips curve implied nonlinearities in the CBB’s reaction function. More specifically, results suggest that
when the output gap is positive, the response of the Selic rate to inflationary gap is increasing in relation to current
inflation, and that it is stronger to positive inflationary gaps than to negative ones. Second, structural break test results
reject the null of stability in the CBB’s reaction function parameters. In general, we noted the presence of a structural
break in the third quarter of 2003. This indicates that the conduct of Brazilian monetary policy in Mr. Armínio Fraga’s
administration was different from Henrique Meirelles’s and Alexandre Tombini’s. Third, there was an increase in the
response of the Selic rate to output gap and a decrease in the reaction to current inflation gap in Meirelles–Tombini’s
administration. Finally, empirical evidence suggests the CBB also reacted to the exchange rate in Meirelles–Tombini’s
administration.
In addition to this introduction, this paper is organized into another four sections. Section 2 introduces the structural
macroeconomic model and the monetary authority’s optimization problem that serves as the theoretical basis for this
study. Section 3 describes the empirical method used to estimate the CBB’s reduced-form reaction function and checks
for the presence of structural breaks in the coefficients of this equation. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5
concludes.
2.  Theoretical  model
In this section, we introduce the structural macroeconomic model and the central bank’s optimization problem, and
we also derive the optimal monetary rule that is robust to specification errors in the model.
2.1.  The  economic  structure
The basic theoretical model upon which the present paper is framed is the standard new Keynesian model analyzed
by Woodford (2003b), Galí (2008) and Tillmann (2011), among others. According to this model, the evolution of an
economy is represented by the following two-equation system:
yt =  Et(yt+1) −  σ−1(it −  Etπt+1 −  rnt ) (1)
πt =  βEtπt+1 +  κt(yt) +  ust (2)
where yt is the output gap (deviation of output from potential output), πt is the inflation rate, Et(yt+1) and Etπt+1 are
the expected output gap values and inflation rate at t + 1 conditional on the information available at t, it is the nominal
interest rate, rnt and ust are, respectively, a natural interest rate shock and a cost shock. It is assumed that rnt and ust are
white noise processes with mean zero and variance equal to 1. Parameter β  ∈  (0,1) is the subjective discount factor
and σ−1 > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The IS curve, given by Eq. (1), is a log-linearized version of Euler equation for consumption derived from households’
optimal decision about consumption and saving, after imposition of the market clearing condition. The expected output
gap value shows that, as households would rather smooth consumption over time, the expectation for a higher level of
consumption leads to an increase in current consumption, thereby boosting the current demand for output.
1 Evidence of the CBB’s unstable reaction function parameters has been provided by Lima et al. (2007) and by Aragon and Medeiros (2013,
2015).
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The Phillips curve, given by Eq. (2), shows the behavior of overlapping nominal prices, through which firms have
 constant probability of keeping output price fixed in any time period (Calvo, 1983). The discrete nature of price
djustment prompts each firm to mark up the price as future inflation expectation rises.
In line with Tillmann (2011), it is assumed that the monetary authority is uncertain over the coefficient that measures
he slope in the Phillips curve, κt, given by:
κt =  κ¯ +  zκt (3)
pecifically, the central bank is cognizant of the reference value of this coefficient, κ¯, but incognizant of the model’s
istortion, zκt . It is also assumed that the central bank is unable to construct a probability distribution for zκt .
.2.  The  monetary  authority’s  optimization  problem
Let us suppose that, conditional on the information available at the beginning of the period, the monetary authority
ttempts to choose the current interest rate it and a sequence of future interest rates so as to minimize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtLt (4)
ubject to Eqs. (1) and (2). The central bank’s loss function at t, Lt, is given by:
Lt = 12[(πt −  π
∗)2 +  λy(yt)2 +  λi(it −  i∗)2] (5)
here π* is the inflation target, λy is the relative weight on output gap, and λi is the relative weight attached to interest
ate stabilization around an implicit target, i*. The monetary authority is assumed to stabilize inflation around the
nflation target, to keep the output gap closed at zero and to stabilize the nominal interest rate around target i*.
Even though the central bank views models (1) and (2) with zκt =  0 (or κt =  κ¯) as most likely, it worries about the
pecification errors of this benchmark model. As the monetary authority is unable to build a probability distribution for
κ
t , it will try to follow a policy that is optimal to the worst possible result in the neighborhood of the benchmark model.
n consonance with Hansen and Sargent (2008), the specification error zκt of the worst case is assumed to be chosen by
 malicious agent who seeks to maximize the central bank’s loss function. The model in which the monetary authority
eeks to choose it so as to minimize loss function (5) and the malicious agent seeks to choose zκt , which maximizes
his loss, was designated by Hansen and Sargent (2008) as the worst-case model.
By minimizing the loss function in the worst possible model within a given set of models, the central bank determines
ts optimal policy by taking into account some specification error in the model. This is done explicitly by supposing
hat, depending on the degree of robustness, the central bank assigns a budget ω  to the malicious agent, who uses these
esources to produce specification error zκt . Therefore, the malicious agent’s budgetary constraint is given by:
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
(zκt )2 ≤  ω  (6)
hen ω  is zero, we have a non-robust control problem, i.e., the optimal policy is not robust to the model’s specification
rror. Hence, to analyze the effects of the specification error, it is necessary to let ω  be a positive constant.
As remarked by Hansen and Sargent (2008), a robust monetary policy is one that solves the following min–max
roblem:
min
{it}
max
{zκt }
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
[(πt −  π∗)2 +  λy(yt)2 +  λi(it −  i∗)2] (7)ubject to Eqs. (1), (2) and (6). Supposing the policymaker and the malicious agent are unable to commit themselves
o an optimal plan, optimization problem (7) is solved under discretion. This implies that the central bank and the
alicious agent take the expectations of the future variables as given and choose, respectively, the interest rate and the
urrent specification error, reoptimizing them every period. In this case, the Lagrangian of the optimization problem
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can be written as:
min
πt,yt ,it
max
zκt
L = 1
2
[(πt −  π∗)2 +  λy(yt)2 +  λi(it −  i∗)2 −  θκ(zκt )2] −  μyt [(yt) −  Et(yt+1)
+ σ−1(it −  Etπt+1 −  rnt )] −  μπt [πt −  βEtπt+1 −  (κ¯  +  zκt )(yt) −  ust ] (8)
where μyt and μπt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the IS curve and with the Phillips curve. Parameter
θκ ∈  ]0,+∞[is inversely related to ω, and indicates the set of models available for the malicious agent. If θκ has a low
value (or if ω  is high), the monetary authority designs a policy that is robust to a wide range of specification errors, zκt .
Thus, a smaller value of θκ indicates the central bank’s deeper concern over the robustness of its policy.
2.3.  The  optimal  monetary  rule
The first-order conditions of min–max problem (8) concerning yt, πt, it and zκt are, respectively:
λy(yt) −  μyt +  (κ¯  +  zκt )μπt =  0 (9)
(πt −  π∗) −  μπt =  0 (10)
λi(it −  i∗) −  μyt σ−1 =  0 (11)
−θκzκt +  μπt (yt) =  0 (12)
Substituting (10) into (12), we obtain zκt =  (θκ)−1(πt −  π∗)(yt). So, we can use (10) and (11) to eliminate the Lagrange
multiplier in (9) and obtain the following optimal interest rate rule:
it =  c0 +  c1(πt −  π∗) +  c2yt +  c3(πt −  π∗)2yt (13)
where
c0 =  i∗; c1 = κ¯σ
−1
λi
; c2 = λyσ
−1
λi
; c3 = θ
−1
κ σ
−1
λi
Note that the difference between monetary rule (13) and the Taylor (1993) rule concerns the inclusion of variable
(πt −  π*)2(yt). In addition, the smaller the value of θκ (i.e., larger preference of the central bank for robustness), the
stronger the central bank’s reaction to variable (πt −  π*)2(yt).
In view of the nonlinear structure of Eq. (13), the reactions of the monetary policy instrument to the deviation of
current inflation from the inflation target and from the output gap are given by:
∂i
∂(π  −  π∗) =  c1 +  2c3(π  −  π
∗)y  (14)
∂i
∂y
= c2 +  c3(π  −  π∗)2 (15)
Eq. (14) shows that, when the output gap is positive, the reaction of the interest rate to the inflationary gap (or deviation
of inflation from the inflation target) has two major characteristics: (i) it is increasing compared to the current inflation;
and (ii) it is larger for positive inflationary gaps than for negative ones with the same magnitude (in absolute terms).
So, as highlighted by Tillmann (2011), the central bank’s uncertainty over the slope in the Phillips curve introduces
nonlinearity and asymmetry into the optimal interest rate rule. With regard to the response to the output gap, Eq. (15)
indicates that a larger inflationary gap produces a stronger reaction to output by the monetary policy.
3.  Econometric  methodologyIn this section, we derive the reduced form for the robust interest rate rule to be estimated, in order to check for
nonlinearities in the CBB’s monetary policy conduct resulting from the specification errors mentioned in Section 2.
Moreover, we present the estimation methods and the structural break tests used to verify the stability of coefficients
in the monetary rule and the data to be used in the study.
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.1.  Reduced  form  of  the  monetary  policy  rule
For the sake of estimation, three changes are made to monetary rule (13). First, a random shock to the interest rate,
t, is included in this equation. Second, we consider a variable inflation target (π∗t ). This change is necessary because,
etween 1999 and 2004, the inflation targets, set by the Brazilian National Monetary Council (CMN), changed on
 yearly basis. Third, we introduced two interest rate lags to capture the tendency of the monetary authority toward
moothing the changes in the monetary policy instrument and toward avoiding serial autocorrelation problems.2,3 By
aking these changes, the specification of the policy rule to be estimated is given by:
it =  d0 +  d1(πt −  π∗t ) +  d2yt +  d3(πt −  π∗t )2yt +  ρ1it−1 +  ρ2it−2 +  υt (16)
here dτ = (1 −  ρ1 −  ρ2)cτ , τ  = 0, 1, 2, 3. Coefficients d1, d2 and d3 (c1, c2 and c3) measure the short-term (long-term)
eaction of the interest rate to the current inflation gap, to the output gap, and to the interaction of the squared inflationary
ap with the output gap.
.2.  Structural  break  tests
Reaction function (16) assumes regression parameters are constant over time. However, after the inflation-targeting
egime was adopted in 1999, the Brazilian economy has been hit by numerous shocks (energy crisis in 2001, exchange
ate crisis in 2002, recession in 2003, world economic crisis in 2008, etc.), and the CBB was administered by three
ifferent presidents (Armínio Fraga, Henrique Meirelles, and Alexandre Tombini). These facts may have altered the
onduct of the Brazilian monetary policy, i.e., they may have changed the CBB’s reaction to inflation rate and output
ap movements. To verify that, this paper uses structural break tests to test the hypothesis of stability of interest rate
ule parameters.
The econometrics literature on tests for structural break in parameters of a regression is comprehensive.4 Recently,
ome studies have considered the problem with running structural break tests on equations with endogenous regressors
i.e., correlated with errors). Hall et al. (2012) show that the minimization of a two-stage least squares criterion
ields consistent estimators for break fractions. Perron and Yamamoto (2014) present a simple proof of Hall et al.’s
2012) results. Additionally, they demonstrate that all assumptions made by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a), obtained
ith original regressors contemporaneously uncorrelated with errors, are satisfied. Therefore, Bai and Perron’s (1998,
003a) results hold for equations with endogenous regressors.
As monetary rule (16) contains potentially endogenous regressors (inflationary gap and output gap), this paper
ollows in the steps of Perron and Yamamoto (2015) and utilizes an alternative procedure to test structural breaks
n linear models with endogenous regressors. This procedure consists in ignoring the endogeneity of regressors and
unning the structural break tests based on the estimation of the structural equation by ordinary least squares (OLS).
his method is justifiable for four reasons, namely: (i) changes in the real parameters of the model imply changes in
he probability limits of the OLS estimator; (ii) the model can be reformulated in order for regressors and errors to be
ncorrelated, thereby allowing the use of the empirical procedure and distribution limits of the structural break tests
ntroduced by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a); (iii) as the regressors obtained by instrumental variables (IV) estimation
ave less quadratic variation than original regressors, a change in the real parameters leads to a deeper change in the
onditional mean of the dependent variable in an OLS framework than in an IV framework; (iv) application of the OLS
pproach leads to consistent estimates of break fractions and ameliorates the efficiency of estimates and test power in
2 The interest rate smoothing is justifiable for several reasons, such as: (i) presence of uncertainties surrounding the values of the macroeconomic
odel’s data and coefficients; (ii) large changes in the interest rate could destabilize the exchange rate and financial markets; (iii) constant oscillations
n the short-term interest rate, even if they were negligible, would have a strong impact on aggregate demand and on the inflation rate. For some
heoretical and empirical research about monetary policy interest rate smoothing, see Clarida et al. (1998), Sack (1998), Woodford (1999, 2003a),
nd Sack and Wieland (2000).
3 This procedure was also adopted by Aragon and Portugal (2010) and Minella and Souza-Sobrinho (2013).
4 There is a large number of statistical and econometric studies on these structural break tests. For an excellent review of these studies, see Perron
2006).
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several situations. In order to illustrate the estimation of structural breaks, let a multiple linear regression model with
m breaks at {T1, .  . ., Tm} be expressed by:
i = ¯Xd  +  υ  (17)
where i  = (i1,  .  . ., iT )′ is the dependent variable and ¯X =  diag(X1, .  .  ., Xm+1) is a T  ×  (m  + 1)p  matrix with Xi =(
xTi−1+1, .  . ., xTi
)′ for i = 1, . . ., m  + 1, T0 = 0 and Tm+1 = T. Note that each matrix Xi is the subset of the matrix of
regressors corresponding to regime i. Matrix ¯X  is a diagonal block of the T  ×  p  matrix of regressors, X, with the
block being based on the set {T1, .  . ., Tm}. Some or all regressors in X may be correlated with the errors. The vector
d = (d′1,  . . ., d′m+1)′ is an (m  + 1)p  vector of coefficients and υ = (υ1,  . .  ., υT )′ is the vector of disturbances.
Let the real break dates be denoted by a superscript 0, i.e., {T 01 ,  .  . ., T 0m}, ¯X0 be a diagonal block of X  according to
{T 01 , . . ., T 0m}  and d0 be the vector of the actual parameter values. In addition, the actual break fractions are denoted by
(λ01, .  . ., λ0m) =  (T 01 /T  . .  ., T 0m/T  ). Therefore, note that the data-generating process (DGP) for (17) can be written as:
i = ¯X0d0 +  P ¯X0υ  +  (I  −  P ¯X0 )υ  = ¯X0[d0 +  ( ¯X′0 ¯X0)
−1
¯X0υ] +  (I  −  P ¯X0 )υ  = ¯X0d∗T +  υ∗ (18)
where υ∗ =  (I  −  P
¯X0 )υ  and d∗T =  d0 +  ( ¯X′0 ¯X0)
−1
¯X0υ. Note that d∗T→pd∗ and ¯X0 is uncorrelated with υ∗. Thus, the
OLS estimator, ˆd∗, will be consistent for d∗. So, the break dates can be estimated by minimization of the sum of
squared residuals of the regression:
i = ¯Xd∗ +  υ∗ (19)
The estimated break dates are given by:
( ˆT ∗1 , . .  ., ˆT ∗m) =  argminT1,...,TmSSR∗T (T1,  .  . ., Tm) (20)
where SSR∗T (T1,  . .  ., Tm) =
(
i  − ¯Xd∗)′(i  − ¯Xd∗) is the sum of squared residuals for block (T1, .  .  ., Tm), such that
Ti −  Ti−1 ≥  q where q  ≥  0 is the minimum amount of observations a regime i should have. Perron and Yamamoto
(2015) show that the estimates of break fractions ( ˆλ∗1,  . .  ., ˆλ0m) =  ( ˆT ∗1 /T,  .  . ., ˆT ∗m/T  ) are consistent and have the same
convergence rate as those obtained from the usual OLS approach with regressors that are uncorrelated with errors.
To check for the presence of structural breaks in the CBB’s reaction function, we follow Bai and Perron (2003a)
and use two tests. The first one is the supFT test, whose objective is to test the null hypothesis of no structural break
against the alternative hypothesis of m  = k  breaks. To calculate the test statistic, we are going to denote (T1, .  . ., Tk) as
the block such that Ti = [Tλi] (i  = 1, . . ., k), and R  as a matrix such that (Rd∗)′ =  (d∗′1 −  d∗
′
2 ,  . .  ., d
∗′
k −  d∗
′
k+1). Define
FT (λ1,  .  . ., λk; p) = 1
T
(
T −  (k  +  1)
kp
)
ˆd∗
′
R′(R ˆV  ( ˆd∗)R′)−1R ˆd∗ (21)
where ˆV  ( ˆd∗) is an estimate of the covariance matrix ˆd∗. The supFT statistic is given by:
supFT(k; p) =  FT(ˆλ∗1,  . .  ., ˆλ∗k ; p) (22)
where ( ˆλ∗1,  .  . ., ˆλ∗k) minimizes the total sum of squared residuals. The asymptotic distribution of the supFT statistic
relies on a trimming parameter, ε  = q/T.
The second test, called FT(l  + 1|l), is aimed at testing the null hypothesis of l breaks against the alternative hypothesis
of l + 1 breaks. For the model with l breaks, the break date estimates are obtained through a sequential procedure (Bai,
1997; Bai and Perron, 1998). Bai and Perron’s (1998, 2003a) strategy consists in testing for the presence of an
additional structural break in each of the l + 1 segments. The test is applied to each segment containing observations
ˆ ˆTi−1 to Ti (i  =  1,  . .  ., l +  1). We reject the null of l  breaks in favor of a model with l  + 1 if the global minimum of the
sum of squared residuals (in all segments in which an additional break is included) is sufficiently smaller than the sum
of the squared residuals of the model with l breaks.
The critical values for the supFT and FT(l  + 1|l) tests are shown in Bai and Perron (2003b). However, when the
correlation between regressors and errors changes between segments or the marginal distribution of regressors contains
modifications (due to a change in the mean and/or variance of regressors), the limit distributions of those statistics
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iffer from the ones described by Bai and Perron (2003b).5 In this case, Perron and Yamamoto (2015) demonstrate
hat the supFT and FT(l  + 1|l) tests can exhibit small size distortions. Following their suggestion, the results will take
nto account the standard critical values and those obtained from the fixed regressor bootstrapping method of Hansen
2000).
Although the OLS-based method is suitable for various situations, we also estimate the break dates and run the tests
or structural breaks based on IV. To do that, we assume there is a set of q  variables zt that can be used as tools. Let
 = (z1, . . ., zT)′ denote a T  ×  q  matrix. We seek to estimate the unknown break dates using observed variables (i, X,
). In this case, the relevant IV regression is given by:
i = ¯X∗d  +  υ˜  (23)
here ¯X∗ =  diag( ˆX1,  . .  ., ˆXm+1), ˆXi =
(
xˆTi−1+1,  . .  ., xˆTi
)′
, and ˆX  = (xˆ1,  . .  ., xˆT )′ =  PZX  where PZ =  Z(Z′Z)−1Z′.
he error term is υ˜  = (υ˜1,  . .  ., υ˜T )′ with υ˜t =  υt +  ηt , ηt =  (x′t − xˆ′t)δj for Tj−1 + 1 ≤  t ≤  Tj. The break date estimates
re given by:
( ˆT1, .  . ., ˆTm) =  argminT1,...,TmSSRT (T1,  . . ., Tm) (24)
here SSRT is the sum of squared residuals of regression (23) estimated by OLS and assessed on (T1, . .  ., Tm).
In practice, we use the following procedure:
i) we estimate the reduced forms of (πt −  π∗t ), yt and (πt −  π∗t )2yt by OLS, we find the break dates sequentially and
use the supFT(l  + 1|l) tests to verify the statistical significance of these changes;
ii) if the reduced forms are unstable, we obtain the predicted values of (πt −  π∗t ), yt and (πt −  π∗t )2yt from each
subsample delimited by the break dates estimated in step (i). If the reduced form is stable, the regressor is obtained
by considering the whole sample;
ii) we estimate reaction function (16) replacing endogenous regressors with those produced in step (ii) and we use
the FT(l  + 1|l) statistic to test for the presence of structural breaks in these equations.
Perron and Yamamoto (2014, 2015) highlight that the IV procedure described above is efficient when compared
o that of Hall et al. (2012) because it uses all the information from the sample.6 However, if the reduced forms are
nstable, the change in marginal distribution of regressors in the estimated structural equation precludes the use of
he critical values demonstrated in Bai and Perron (2003b) for the supFT and FT(l  + 1|l) tests. In this case, we follow
erron and Yamamoto (2015) and use the fixed regressor bootstrapping method of Hansen (2000).
.  Results
.1.  Data  and  unit  root  test
The estimation of the CBB’s nonlinear reaction functions described in Section 3.1 is based on monthly data for
anuary 2000 to December 2013. The series is obtained from the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economics Research
IPEA) and Central Bank of Brazil websites. The dependent variable, it, is the annualized Selic interest rate accumulated
onthly. This variable has been employed as the main monetary policy instrument under the inflation-targeting regime.
The inflation rate, πt, is the inflation accumulated over the past 12 months, measured by the broad consumer price
ndex (IPCA).7 The monthly inflation target (π∗t ) is obtained from the linear interpolation of annual targets.
The output gap, y , is measured by the percentage difference between the seasonally adjusted industrial productiont
ndex and potential output. Here, there is an important problem, as potential output is an unobserved variable and, for that
eason, it must be estimated. Therefore, the proxy for potential output is obtained as follows: by the Hodrick–Prescott
5 For structural break tests with changes in the marginal distribution of regressors, see Hansen (2000).
6 Hall et al.’s (2012) procedure consists in running tests for changes in the parameters of the structural form for all subsamples defined by the
stimated break dates in reduced forms.
7 IPCA is calculated by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and this is the price index used by the Brazilian National
onetary Council as benchmark for the inflation-targeting regime.
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Table 1
Unit root tests.
Variable Exogenous regressors ADF(k) ERS MZGLSα (k) MZGLSt (k)
it c,t −3.309*(4) 3.690***(4) −25.40***(4) −3.558***(4)
πt c −1.909(13) 3.325*(13) −8.432**(13) −2.022**(13)
π∗t c −3.225**(0) 5.271(0) −5.866*(0) −1.657*(0)
yHP,t – −3.521***(0) 1.418***(13) −18.75***(0) −3.036***(0)
yTL,t – −2.497**(0) 3.073***(0) −9.305**(0) −2.070**(0)
yTQ,t – −2.792***(0) 2.613**(0) −10.59**(0) −2.254**(0)
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
(HP) filter, by a linear trend (LT) model and by a quadratic trend (QT) model. The output gap series built upon the
different potential output estimates are denoted as yHP,t (HP), yTL,t (LT) and yTQ,t (QT).
To check the stationarity of the variables, we used four unit root tests, namely: ADF (Augmented Dickey–Fuller),
ERS, by Elliott et al. (1996), and MZGLSα and MZGLSt , suggested by Perron and Ng (1996) and Ng and Perron
(2001).8 As recommended by Ng and Perron (2001), the choice of the number of lags (k) was based on the modified
Akaike information criterion (MAIC), considering a maximum number of lags of kmax  = int(12(T/100)1/4) = 13. As
deterministic components, we included constant (c) and a linear trend (t) for the case in which these components were
statistically significant. The results in Table 1 show that, in general, we can reject the unit root hypothesis in the Selic
rate, inflation, inflation target, and output gap series.
4.2.  The  CBB’s  reaction  function  with  constant  parameters
Initially, we estimated the CBB’s reaction function by assuming the parameters of this equation are constant. Since
inflation and output gap are potentially endogenous variables, interest rate rule (16) is estimated using the IV method,
with robustness of the covariance matrix to heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the residuals. Specifically,
we employed the method proposed by Newey and West (1987) with Bartlett kernel and fixed bandwidth to estimate
the variance and covariance matrix. The instruments used are a constant term, lags 1–2 of the Selic rate and of the
deviation of inflation from the target, lags 2–3 of output gap, nominal exchange rate movement at t −  1 (Et−1) and
interaction of the squared inflationary gap with output gap at t  −  2. These instruments imply two overidentification
constraints. The validity of these constraints is tested by the J  test of Hansen (1982). Additionally, another two tests
are utilized, namely: (i) Durbin–Wu–Hausmann’s test to test the null of exogeneity of regressors (πt −  π∗t ), yt and
(πt −  π∗t )2yt ; and (ii) the Cragg–Donald F  statistic, proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005), to test the null hypothesis
that the instruments are weak.9
In Table 2, the test results for the different output gap measures indicate we can reject the hypotheses that regressors
(πt −  π∗t ), yt and (πt −  π∗t )2yt are exogenous, and that the instruments used in the regressions are weak. Moreover, the
J test shows we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the overidentification constraints are satisfied.
The estimates of reaction function (16) parameters are reported in Table 2. Except for d0, the monetary rule coefficient
values were significant at 5% and quite similar, given the different output gap measures. The estimates for the short-term
response of the Selic rate to the inflationary gap, d1, were equal to 0.075 for the HP specification, and 0.106 for the LT
specification. For the output gap, the values of coefficient d2 indicate that the CBB has also reacted to this variable,
but less strongly compared to the inflationary gap.As to the nonlinearity in the CBB’s reaction function, note that coefficient d3 was positive and statistically different
from zero. This suggests the uncertainty over the effects of output gap on inflation has been important in explaining the
adjustment of the Selic rate. In addition, the significance of d3 indicates that, when output gap is positive, the reaction
8 The null hypothesis of the tests is that the series is nonstationary, i.e., unit root.
9 As stressed by Stock and Yogo (2005), the presence of weak instruments may yield biased IV estimators. Thus, by following these authors,
the instruments are considered to be weak when the IV estimator bias relative to the OLS estimator bias is larger than some value b (for instance,
b = 5%).
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Table 2
CBB’s reaction function estimates.
Parameters HP LT QT
d0 0.034
(0.078)
0.084
(0.081)
0.034
(0.079)
d1 0.075***
(0.024)
0.106***
(0.033)
0.105***
(0.033)
d2 0.022**
(0.008)
0.017**
(0.007)
0.019**
(0.008)
d3 0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
θ1 1.776***
(0.080)
1.790***
(0.087)
1.788***
(0.079)
θ2 −0.786***
(0.078)
−0.806***
(0.084)
−0.800***
(0.076)
∂i/∂(π − π*) 6.515 5.272 6.981
∂i/∂(y) 4.606 2.519 3.256
J-statistic (p-value) 0.548 0.489 0.414
Hausmann’s test
(p-value)
0.000 0.000 0.000
Cragg–Donald F-stat 14.79a 14.18a 15.15a
Adjusted R2 0.995 0.995 0.995
aIndicates that the relative bias of the IV estimator compared to the OLS estimator does not exceed 5%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
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ihe standard errors are in brackets.
f the Selic rate to the inflationary gap is increasing in relation to current inflation, and is larger for positive inflationary
aps than for negative ones with the same magnitude (in absolute terms).
Given the nonlinear structure of the reaction function, the long-term response of the Selic rate to the inflationary
ap is given by ∂i/∂(π  −  π*) = [d1 + 2d3E(π  −  π*)y]/(1 −  ρ1 −  ρ2), where E(•) denotes the sample mean. The results
hown in Table 2 indicate that the response of the Selic rate to a one-percentage-point inflationary gap was equal to
.52 for the HP specification, and 5.27 for the LT specification. This shows that the monetary policy rule has fulfilled
he Taylor (1993) principle, i.e., the CBB has risen the Selic rate by enough to augment the real interest rate in response
o an increase in the current inflation gap. Note also that the estimates of ∂i/∂(π  − π*) are higher than those obtained
y Moura and Carvalho (2010), Aragon and Portugal (2010) and Aragon and Medeiros (2013). These works do not
ake into account the nonlinearity that results from the uncertainty over the slope in the Phillips curve, and they assess
he policy conduct for a shorter period of the inflation-targeting regime.
The long-term response of the Selic rate to the output gap, given by ∂i/∂y  = [d2 + d3E((π  −  π*)2)]/(1 −  ρ1 −  ρ2),
hows that the CBB has reacted to the output gap. When we compare the results of the three specifications, we perceive
he reaction of the Selic rate was stronger to the output gap calculated with the HP filter and weaker for the output gap
btained from the linear trend model.
Finally, the Selic rate smoothing for different output gap measures was approximately equal to 0.990, 0.988 and
.984, respectively. This finding is in line with the literature on short-term interest rate smoothing and reflects the
djustment of this policy instrument at discrete intervals and amounts.
.3.  The  CBB’s  reaction  function  with  structural  break
An important assumption about the monetary rule described in the previous section is that its parameters have been
table throughout the analyzed period. Here, we relaxed this assumption and investigated the presence of structural
reaks in the CBB’s reaction function coefficients. To do that, we used the OLS-based and IV-based methods described
n Section 3.2.
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Table 3
Structural break tests for reduced forms.
Reaction function Dependent variable supF(1) FT(2|1) FT(3|2) Break dates
(HP)
πt − π∗t 96.62** 63.96*** 27.62 03:01;05:04
yHP,t 66.07*** 78.83*** 41.78*** 05:03;08:11;10:11
(πt − π∗t )2yHP,t 468.1*** 42.44 – 03:08
(LT)
πt − π∗t 98.25** 52.59*** 35.95** 03:01;05:01;10:05
yTL,t 66.01*** 93.36*** 64.83*** 04:07;08:11;10:11
(πt − π∗t )2yTL,t 470.9*** 44.80 – 03:08
(QT)
πt − π∗t 99.28** 54.77** 33.49* 03:01;05:01;10:05
yTQ,t 57.74*** 91.46*** 60.48*** 04:07;08:11;10:11
(πt − π∗t )2yTO,t 444.7*** 45.12 – 03:08
Note: The test was based on the fixed regressor bootstrapping method of Hansen (2000).
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
Table 4
Structural break tests in the CBB’s reaction function.
Specif. supFT(1) FT(2|1) Break date
OLS-based method
(HP) 75.01** 17.42 03:07
(LT) 77.18** 20.40 03:07
(QT) 78.88*** 20.21 03:07
IV-based method
(HP) 57.71** 17.04 03:07
(LT) 60.09*** 21.24 03:07
(QT) 61.36** 21.12 03:07
Note: The test was carried out by the fixed regressor bootstrapping method of Hansen (2000).
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
Initially, we tested the stability of the parameters of the reduced forms. This procedure is necessary for the application
of the structural break tests in the IV method.10 Table 3 shows the structural break test results and the break date estimates
for the reduced form of each endogenous variable of reaction function (16) using different output gap measures.11
Following Perron and Yamamoto (2015), we used the fixed regressor bootstrapping method of Hansen (2000) to assess
the significance of the tests.12 The test results show there is at least one break in each equation. Except for the variable
(πt −  π∗t )2yt , which has only one break, the FT(l  + 1|l) test indicates the existence of multiple breaks in reduced forms
for the current inflation gap and output gap in their different measures. With respect to the break dates, we verified
that the dates are similar across the different output gap measures. Furthermore, we found that 45% of the breaks took
place in 2003 and 2008, which were periods of instability and of economic crisis in Brazil.
Now, we will test the stability of the CBB’s reaction function parameters through the OLS- and IV-based methods.
Table 4 displays the test results and break date estimates. Note that in both the OLS- and IV-based methods, the supF
test allows rejecting the null hypothesis of stability of the CBB’s reaction function parameters at a 5% significance
level. In turn, the FT(2|1) test indicates the existence of only one structural break. The estimated break date (July 2003)
suggests the conduct of the Brazilian monetary policy was different between Armínio Fraga’s and Henrique Meirelles’s
and Alexandre Tombini’s administrations. This finding is consistent with those of Aragon and Medeiros (2013).
10 As suggested by Perron and Yamamoto (2014, 2015), Hall et al. (2012) and Boldea et al. (2012).
11 For all structural break tests, we considered Bai and Perron’s (1998) sequential procedure, we set the maximum number of breaks at 3 and we
used a 15% trimming (which implies that each regime has at least 23 observations).
12 For all tests, the number of bootstrap replications was equal to 1000.
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Table 5
CBB’s reaction function estimates.
Parameters HP TL TQ
00:04–03:07 03:08–13:12 00:04–03:07 03:08–13:12 00:04–03:07 03:08–13:12
d0 1.265
(1.232)
0.127**
(0.061)
1.350
(1.088)
0.183***
(0.060)
1.199
(1.081)
0.136**
(0.064)
d1 0.284***
(0.075)
0.006
(0.015)
0.294***
(0.080)
0.021
(0.015)
0.292***
(0.078)
0.026*
(0.015)
d2 0.010
(0.054)
0.015***
(0.004)
0.013
(0.055)
0.010**
(0.005)
0.026
(0.052)
0.012**
(0.005)
d3 0.002*
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.0004)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.0003)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.0003)
θ1 1.410***
(0.129)
1.723***
(0.057)
1.444***
(0.125)
1.712***
(0.056)
1.471***
(0.121)
1.691***
(0.057)
θ2 −0.530***
(0.104)
−0.735***
(0.055)
−0.567***
(0.095)
−0.730***
(0.054)
−0.584***
(0.089)
−0.706***
(0.056)
∂i/∂(π − π*) 2.144 0.398 1.977 0.904 2.110 1.420
∂i/∂(y) 0.558 2.193 0.521 1.162 0.636 1.520
Adjusted R2 0.997 0.997 0.997
Note: Standard errors (in brackets).
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
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Given the structural break test results, the next step consists of the estimation of reaction functions for two
ubperiods determined by the break date, namely: 2000:04–2003:07 (Fraga’s administration) and 2003:08–2013:12
Meirelles–Tombini’s administration). The IV estimation method was used, taking into consideration reduced-form
tructural breaks. Table 5 shows the results for the model. In general, we perceive that the estimated coefficients
re similar when analyzed for different output gap measures. Specifically, results reveal a weaker reaction of the
hort-term Selic rate to inflationary gap (d1). For all specifications that consider different output gap measures, coeffi-
ient d1 was significant at 1% in Fraga’s administration. Conversely, in Meirelles–Tombini’s administration, only
olicy rule with yTQ,t yielded a coefficient d1 statistically different from zero. As to the short-term response of
he Selic rate to output gap (d2), we observed it was not significant in Fraga’s administration, but it was positive
nd significant in Meirelles–Tombini’s administration. Results also demonstrate that coefficient d3, which measures
he effect of the uncertainty over the tradeoff in the Phillips curve on the Selic rate, increased slightly after the
reak date.
The importance in taking into account the uncertainty in the Phillips curve is observed in the long-term reactions of
he CBB to the inflationary and output gaps. As outlined in Table 5, the CBB’s long-term reaction to inflationary gap
∂i/∂(π −  π*)) decreased after the break date. This indicates that, despite the increase in d3, the weaker response to
he inflationary gap forced down the long-term reaction of the Selic rate to inflation. On the other hand, the long-term
esponse to output gap, given by ∂i/∂y, increased after Meirelles–Tombini’s administration owing to the increase in
oth coefficients d2 and d3. The Brazilian monetary authority’s closer attention to the excess demand after 2003 was
lso verified by Aragon and Medeiros (2015).
.4.  Robustness  analysis
In this subsection, we deal with the robustness of the results described in the previous section. The objectives of
his exercise are: (i) to extend Tillmann’s (2011) model to check if those results are maintained when the CBB’s
ptimization problem and the structural macroeconomic model take the exchange rate into consideration; and (ii) to
nvestigate how the CBB has reacted to exchange rate movements. Besides, we seek to estimate a reaction function in
hich the monetary authority acts in a forward-looking manner by responding to the deviations of expected inflation
rom the inflation target.
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Regarding the importance of the exchange rate to the conduct of monetary policy, several studies have investigated
whether central banks have reacted directly to exchange rate movements. Clarida et al. (1998) reveal that the central
banks of Germany and of Japan include the real exchange rate in their reaction functions, although the magnitude of
these reactions is negligible. Mohanty and Klau (2004) estimate modified Taylor rules and observe that several central
banks of emerging countries (such as Brazil and Chile) respond to exchange rate movements. Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) estimate a DSGE model for Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom and note that only the
central banks of the first two countries respond to the exchange rate. Consonant with Lubik and Schorfheide (2007),
Furlani et al. (2010) demonstrate that the CBB does not change the Selic rate in response to exchange rate movements.
Mello and Moccero (2009) observe that the monetary policy instrument reacts to exchange rate in Mexico, but not in
Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Aizenman et al. (2011) and Ostry et al. (2012) point out that the central banks of several
emerging markets which adopted the inflation-targeting regime respond to exchange rate movements.
Many are the reasons for the monetary authority to show some direct concern for the exchange rate. First, in
an economy with some of its debt denominated in foreign currency, exchange rate depreciations may increase debt
service, interfere with firms’ and banks’ balance sheets, restrict credit, cause a surge in filings for bankruptcy, and
reduce unemployment and aggregate output. Hausmann et al. (2001) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) underscore that
the effects on economic agents’ balance sheets have been the main reason why central banks try to avoid devaluating
their currencies in the presence of external shocks. On the other hand, Aghion et al. (2009) develop a theoretical model
to demonstrate exchange rate appreciations can reduce firms’ gains and, consequently, their capacity to take loans and
make innovations. This would negatively affect long-term output growth, with a greater impact on economies with a
less developed financial system. Aizenman et al. (2011) introduce a simple macroeconomic model for assessment of
monetary policy in a small open economy. They noticed that a heavy weight on exchange rate volatility in the central
bank’s loss function increases the reaction of the policy instrument to exchange rate and may bring welfare gains.
These authors also argue that these gains can be higher in emerging economies, in those which export commodities,
in those vulnerable to shocks on terms of trade, and in those with a less developed financial system.
To check whether the CBB has reacted to the exchange rate in an environment characterized by uncertainty about
the slope in the Phillips curve, we followed the model of Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Galí (2008) for a small open
economy and we assumed that the discretionary policy of this policymaker consists in choosing the Selic rate in period
t so as to optimize the following loss function:
min max
{it}{zkt }
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
[(πt −  π∗)2 +  λyy2t +  λqq2t +  λi(it −  i∗)2] (25)
subject to
yt =  Etyt+1 −  σ−1α (it −  Etπt+1 −  rnt ) −  σ−1α α(1 −  α)−1Et(qt+1 −  qt) (26)
πt =  βEtπt+1 +  (κα +  zkt )yt −  βα(1 −  α)−1Et(qt+1 −  qt) +  α(1 −  α)−1Et(qt −  qt−1) +  ust (27)
qt =  Etqt+1 −  (it −  Etπt+1) +  εt (28)
Et
∞∑
t=0
βτ(zkt )
2 ≤  ω  (29)
where πt is the inflation measured by the IPCA, qt is the real effective exchange rate gap (i.e., the deviation of the
natural logarithm of the real effective exchange rate from the HP-estimated trend), λq is the relative weight of the real
exchange rate gap in the CBB’s loss function, E (q ) is the expected real exchange rate for period t  + 1, and ε is at t+1 t
white-noise error term that reflects the impact of other exchange rate determinants (such as risk premium movements).13
As shown in Galí (2008), parameters σα, κα > 0 are convolutions of the structural macroeconomic model parameters
and α  ∈  [0,1] is regarded as a measure of economic openness. From Eqs. (26) and (27), we may note that, given Etqt+1,
13 We used the series (no. 11752) of the real exchange rate index – IPCA published by the CBB. The exchange rate gap was obtained from the HP
filter.
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Table 6
Structural break tests for reduced forms.
Reaction function Dependent variable supF(1) FT(2|1) FT(3|2) Break dates
(31)
πt − π∗t 114.7*** 116.5*** 35.54** 03:01;05:02;08:12
yHP,t 155.2*** 50.64*** 20.95 06:03;09:03
(πt − π∗t )2y1t 480.8*** 175.3*** 53.12*** 02:08;04:08;08:10
qt 30.62 – – –
(32)
(πe
t,t+11 − π∗t ) 315.7*** 36.36** 19.72 03:01;05:02
yHP,t 143.3*** 35.59** 33.35** 03:08;07:12;10:01
(πe
t,t+11 − π∗t )2yHP,t 187.1** 55.69** 31.94 02:11;04:11
qt 42.85** 24.53 – 02:10
Note: The test was carried out by the fixed regressor bootstrapping method of Hansen (2000).
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** Significance at 1%.
n exchange rate depreciation (increase of qt) has a direct positive effect on the output gap and inflation. Eq. (28) shows
he exchange rate is determined by the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP).14
The first-order conditions resulting from the optimization of loss function (25) subject to constraints (26)–(28) can
e combined to yield the following interest rate rule:
it =  [c0 +  c1(πt −  π∗t ) +  c2yt +  c3(πt −  π∗t )2yt +  c4qt] (30)
here
c0 =  i∗; c1 =  [κα +  α(1 +  β)σα]/[λiσα(1 −  α)]; c2 =  λy/[λiσα(1 −  α)];
c3 =  1/[λiσα(1 −  α)θk]; c4 =  λq/λi
onsidering a variable inflation target and inserting the nominal interest rate into t  −  1 and t  −  2 and a random shock,
t, into (30), we obtained the following specification for the reaction function:
it =  d0 +  d1(πt −  π∗t ) +  d2yt +  d3(πt −  π∗t )2yt +  d4qt +  ρ1it−1 +  ρ2it−2 +  υt (31)
here dτ = (1 −  ρ1 −  ρ2)cτ , τ = 0, 1, 2, 3,4.
In addition, we followed Minella et al. (2003), de Mello and Moccero (2009), Aragon and Portugal (2010) and
inella and Souza-Sobrinho (2013) and also estimated a reaction function specification that includes the deviation of
nflation expectations from the inflation target. In this case, the monetary policy rule is expressed by:
it =  d0 +  d1(πet,t+11 −  π∗t ) +  d2yt +  d3(πet,t+11 −  π∗t )2yt +  d4qt +  ρ1it−1 +  ρ2it−2 +  υt (32)
here πet,t+11 is the expected inflation 12 months ahead conditional on the information available at t.15,16
In the estimation of specifications (31) and (32), we used the output gap calculated with the HP filter and we took
nto account the endogeneity of inflationary gaps (both current and expected), of output, and of the exchange rate.17
able 6 shows the structural break tests for the reduced forms of endogenous regressors. In general, the break tests were
14 We followed some literature references and set the external (exogenous) variables to zero (see, for instance, Bonomo and Brito, 2002; Leitemo
nd Söderström, 2008).
15 The expected inflation (πe
t,t+11) concerns the median of inflation forecasts 12 months ahead (inflation accumulated between t and t + 11) made by
he market and collected by the CBB’s Investor Relations Group (Gerin). For the period between January 2000 and October 2001, the CBB’s survey
oes not provide direct information about the inflation rate expected for the next 12 months, but it supplies information about inflation expectations
or the current and subsequent years. In this case, one follows Carvalho and Minella (2012) and obtains an approximation to πe
t,t+11 subtracting
he effective inflation value up to the current month from the expectations for the current year and using the expectations for the following year
roportionally to the number of remaining months.
16 For the determinants of inflation expectations in Brazil, see Bevilaqua et al. (2008) and Carvalho and Minella (2012).
17 For specification (31), the instruments used were it−1, it−2, πt−1 − π∗t−1, πt−2 − π∗t−2, yHP,t−2, yHP,t−3, (πt−2 − π∗t−2)2yHP,t−2, qt−1 and a
onstant. For specification (32), we included instruments it−1, it−2, πet−1,t+10 − π∗t−1, πet−2,t+9 − π∗t−2, yHP,t−2, yHP,t−3, (πet−2,t+9 − π∗t−2)2yHP,t−2,
t−1 and a constant.
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Table 7
Structural break tests in CBB’s reaction function.
Specif. supFT(1) supFT(2|1) supFT(3|1) T1
OLS-based method
(31) 85.69*** 14.81 – 03:07
(32) 50.65** 25.83 – 02:10
IV-based method
(31) 79.33** 29.32 – 03:07
(32) 30.49 – – –
Note: The test was carried out by the fixed regressor bootstrapping method of Hansen (2000).
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
Table 8
CBB’s reaction function estimates.
Parameters (31) (32)
00:04–03:07 03:08–13:12 00:04–02:10 02:11–13:12
d0 1.475
(1.506)
0.110**
(0.055)
3.794
(2.419)
0.070
(0.061)
d1 0.272***
(0.078)
−0.002
(0.011)
0.202
(0.146)
0.080**
(0.033)
d2 0.032
(0.080)
0.026***
(0.006)
−0.136
(0.111)
0.026***
(0.007)
d3 0.002**
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.0003)
0.009***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.0004)
d4 0.015***
(0.006)
0.010***
(0.003)
0.005
(0.012)
0.007**
(0.003)
θ1 1.283***
(0.133)
1.687***
(0.045)
1.242***
(0.184)
1.691***
(0.081)
θ2 −0.414***
(0.074)
−0.698***
(0.043)
−0.462***
(0.096)
−0.701***
(0.080)
∂i/∂(π − π*) 1.918 −0.293 0.913 8.245
∂i/∂(y) 0.612 3.716 −0.543 2.864
Adjusted R2 0.998 0.997
Note: Standard errors (in brackets).
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
statistically different from zero, except for the reduced form of the exchange rate in specification (31). In addition, the
FT(l  + 1|l) test indicates three structural breaks in the parameters of the equations of (πt −  π∗t ), (πt −  π∗t )2yHP,t and
yHP,t (in specification 32), and two breaks in the equations of yHP,t (in rule 31), (πet,t+11 −  π∗t ) and (πet,t+11 −  π∗t )2yHP,t .
Note that these breaks are taken into consideration in the first stage of the IV estimation of reaction functions.
Table 7 displays the tests for the instability in the parameters of reaction functions (31) and (32). The OLS-based
tests indicate it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of one break in both specifications, whereas the IV-based method
only identifies one break in reaction function (31). We followed the OLS-based method because it is, in general, more
powerful for the identification of the number of breaks than the IV-based method (Perron and Yamamoto, 2015). Bai
and Perron’s (1998) sequential method estimated a break in 2003:07 for specification (31), and a break in 2002:10
for specification (32). Once again, these dates allow classifying the conduct of the Brazilian monetary policy into two
administrations: Fraga’s and Meirelles–Tombini’s.
Table 8 shows the estimates for reaction functions (31) and (32) obtained by IV for the subperiods determined by
the OLS-based method. Initially, the coefficient that implies nonlinearity for the CBB’s monetary rule, d3, is positive
in both specifications and statistically significant at 5% except for the period 2002:11 to 2013:12 in specification (32).
In addition, it should be noted that the response of the interest rate to the exchange rate was positive and significant
at
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t 1% in specification (31) and significant at 5% in the second subperiod in specification (32). This is consistent with
he evidence gathered by Soares and Barbosa (2006), who obtained a positive response of the Selic rate to the real
xchange rate, and by Palma and Portugal (2014), who show that the CBB has given a positive weight to the real
xchange rate in its loss function.
As to the reactions to inflation and to output, the results indicate that, for specification (31), the long-term response to
he inflationary gap decreased, while that of the interest rate to output gap increased. These findings are similar to those
escribed in Section 4.3 for a monetary rule in a closed economy. For specification (32), long-term responses indicate
hat both the reaction to the expected inflation gap and the reaction to the output gap increased in Meirelles–Tombini’s
dministration. This suggests that, in this administration, the CBB was more forward-looking, i.e., more concerned
bout the deviations of expected inflation than about the deviation of current inflation from the target.
.  Conclusion
This paper’s overall aim was to check for the presence of nonlinearities in the CBB’s reaction function as a
onsequence of this policymaker’s concern about specification errors in the macroeconomic model. The specific aims
ere: (i) to obtain a nonlinear optimal monetary rule that could be robust to the uncertainties over the potential output
nd the effects of output gap on inflation; (ii) to verify the existence of nonlinearities in the CBB’s interest rate rule
aused by specification errors; and (iii) to run structural break tests to assess possible changes in the CBB’s reaction
unction coefficients during the inflation-targeting regime.
Due to the presence of potentially endogenous regressors in the reaction function, the method used to test structural
reaks in the CBB’s reaction function parameters was developed by Perron and Yamamoto (2015). The procedure
roposed by these authors is based on the estimation of the model by OLS and IV, which allows estimating the
tructural break dates and running tests to verify whether these breaks are statistically significant.
The structural break test results strongly rejected the null hypothesis of stability in the CBB’s reaction function
arameters. In general, we observed the presence of a structural break in the third quarter of 2003. This indicates
he conduct of the Brazilian monetary policy in Armínio Fraga’s administration was different from that in Henrique
eirelles’s, and also different from Alexandre Tombini’s.
Moreover, empirical evidence points out that the uncertainties over the slope in the Phillips curve implied nonlin-
arities in the CBB’s reaction function. Specifically, results suggest that when the output gap is positive, the response
f the Selic rate to inflationary gap is increasing compared to the current inflation, and is larger for positive inflationary
aps than for negative ones. We also observed an increase in the response of the Selic rate to output gap and a reduction
n the reaction to the current inflation gap in Meirelles–Tombini’s administration. Finally, empirical evidence also
uggests the CBB has reacted to the exchange rate during Meirelles–Tombini’s administration.
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